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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
J. William Gray, Jr. *
Katherine E. Ramsey **
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 General Assembly of Virginia made substantial
changes in the augmented estate rights of surviving spouses. It
also modified and codified the rules governing powers of ap-
pointment. Other legislation affecting wills, trusts, and estates
included clarifications and technical corrections relating to such
subjects as creditors' claims to life insurance and annuities, court-
created trusts, protection of adults from exploitation, creditor pro-
tection for residential property, unclaimed assets, guardianships,
and nonstock corporation procedure.1 Five decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia addressed fiduciary conflicts, tenancies
by the entirety, lost wills, contract rights in residences, and no-
contest clauses.
I. LEGISLATION
A. Revised Augmented Estate System
Virginia's augmented estate rules, enacted a quarter-century
ago to protect surviving spouses against disinheritance, have
been revised to conform more closely to the Uniform Probate Code
for decedents dying after 2016.2 Current law entitles a spouse to a
* Partner, Hunton & Williams LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1977, University of
Virginia; B.S.I.E., B.A., 1973, Rutgers University.
** Partner, Virginia Estate & Trust Law PLC, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1998, Uni-
versity of Virginia; M.S., 1988, Boston University; B.A., 1986, Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute and State University.
1. All 2016 legislation summarized in this article became effective July 1, 2016, ex-
cept the augmented estate legislation described in Part I.A, which takes effect January 1,
2017.
2. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201-214 (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 140, 140-
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minimum share of not only the decedent's probate estate but also
most nonprobate assets and certain assets the decedent trans-
ferred to third parties during life.' Like the dower, curtesy, and
elective share provisions it replaced, the current augmented es-
tate system grew out of a legislative determination that every
Virginia decedent should make a certain portion of his4 estate
available to support his surviving spouse (the "spousal support
theory").5 The 2017 revisions, however, are premised on the idea
that each spouse should be entitled to up to half of the collective
assets they have brought to, or accumulated during, the marriage
(the "economic partnership theory"), with the surviving spouse's
right vesting gradually over the course of the marriage.6
Under the new augmented estate rules, a determination of the
surviving spouse's property rights begins with the value of the
decedent's probate estate; net of funeral and administration ex-
penses (other than transfer taxes); the homestead, family, and
exempt property allowances; and enforceable claims.7 The net
probate estate value then is augmented by the value of assets the
decedent transferred to the surviving spouse and, in most cases,
to third parties! The following are some of the important addi-
tions.
191 (2013), with Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 187, 2016 Va. Acts -, - (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-300 to -308.17 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
3. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-300 to -308 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
4. To avoid syntactic awkwardness or ambiguity and to recognize actuarial reality,
this discussion of spousal rights uses masculine pronouns to refer to the first spouse to die
and feminine pronouns to refer to the surviving spouse.
5. See generally J. William Gray, Jr., Annual Survey of Viginia Law: Virginia's Aug-
mented Estate System, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1990) (discussing the "spousal
support theory" and the augmented estate system).
6. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE, Art. II, pt. 2, general cmt., 8 U.L.A. 140 (2013).
7. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 187, 2016 Va. Acts __ - (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-308.5 (Cum. Supp. 2016)). The current terms and amounts of the family, exempt
property, and homestead allowances remain in effect. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-309-311
(Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016). While the new augmented estate statute allows the
surviving spouse to receive all three allowances in addition to her elective share amount,
the homestead allowance statute continues to provide that the surviving spouse may not
claim both a homestead allowance and an elective share. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-
308.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016), with id. § 64.2-311(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
8. See Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 187, 2016 Va. Acts __, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.2-308.6, -308.7 (Cum. Supp. 2016)). The value of the decedent's non-probate trans-
fers to third parties is not included in the augmented estate if the surviving spouse does
not file a complaint to determine the elective share within the prescribed statutory period.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.12(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016); see also infra notes 27-28 and ac-
companying text. This offers repose to third party donees, who may not be in a position to
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(1) Property over which the decedent alone held a presently ex-
ercisable power to appoint to himself, his estate, his creditors, or
the creditors of his estate.9
(2) The decedent's interest in property owned with another as
joint tenants with right of survivorship."
(3) The decedent's interest in assets held with pay-on-death or
transfer-on-death designations or in co-ownership registration
with another with the right of survivorship."
(4) Proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life to the extent he
owned the policy or held a presently exercisable general power of
appointment over it.
12
(5) Property the decedent irrevocably transferred during his
lifetime but in which he retained rights to income or possession
that continued until his death."
(6) Property the decedent transferred while retaining a power
to appoint income or principal for the benefit of himself, his credi-
tors, his estate, or the creditors of his estate, whether exercisable
alone, in conjunction with another, or solely by a non-adverse
party.1
4
(7) Property the decedent transferred to someone other than
the surviving spouse during the marriage and within two years of
his death, to the extent the property would have been included in
his augmented estate if he had retained it, or his rights over it,
until his death."
(8) Other property the decedent transferred to someone other
than the surviving spouse during the marriage and within two
years before his death, to the extent the transfers to any one re-
know if the surviving spouse has filed a claim for the elective share.
9. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 187, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.2-308.6(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2016) (property passing to third parties); codified at id. §
64.2-308.7(3) (Cum. Supp. 2016) (property passing to surviving spouse)).
10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-308.6(1)(b), -308.7(1) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
11. Id. §§ 64.2-308.6(1)(c), -308.7(2) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
12. Id. §§ 64.2-308.6(1)(d), -308.7(3) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
13. Id. §§ 64.2-308.6(2)(a), -308.7(3) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
14. Id. §§ 64.2-308.6(2)(b), -308.7(3) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
15. Id. § 64.2-308.6(3)(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
2016]
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cipient in either year exceeded the applicable federal gift tax ex-
clusion amount for annual gifts of present interests.6
(9) To the extent not already included under the preceding
rules, the net value of the surviving spouse's other property also
is added to the augmented estate, along with the net value of the
surviving spouse's lifetime transfers to third parties that would
have been included in her augmented estate if she had died first. 7
Despite these general rules of inclusion, a lifetime transfer by
the decedent is not pulled back into the augmented estate to the
extent it was transferred for adequate consideration or with the
surviving spouse's written consent or joinder." Perhaps most sig-
nificantly, the statute also continues the Virginia exclusion, not
found in the Uniform Probate Code, for the value of property the
decedent or the surviving spouse received from third parties to
the extent it was received without full consideration and main-
tained as separate property.9
The statute helpfully sets forth specific rules for valuing life es-
tates, remainders, and partial and contingent interests, as well as
protections against double-counting.2' It also adopts a rule by
which a surviving spouse's interest in a trust may be valued
without any discount.1
Consistent with the partnership theory of marriage, the statute
entitles the surviving spouse to up to half of the augmented es-
tate value. 2 The actual amount depends on the duration of the
16. Id. § 64.2-308.6(3)(c) (Cum. Supp. 2016). The applicable federal gift tax exclusion
for 2015 and 2016 is $14,000 per donee per year. See 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2012).
17. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 187, 2016 Va. Acts __ - (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-308.8 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.9(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
19. Id. § 64.2-308.9(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
20. See id. § 64.2-308.9(C)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016). The value of includable assets is
reduced by enforceable claims against them. Id. § 64.2-308.9(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2016). Life
estate, remainder, and other partial interests are to be valued as provided in Virginia
Code sections 55-269.1 through -277. Id. § 55-269.1 to -277 (Cum. Supp. 2016). However,
the value of such an interest passing to the surviving spouse is determined under special
rules that take into account her rights and applicable contingencies and that assign to her
an actuarial life expectancy of at least ten years. See Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 187, 2016 Va.
Acts -, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.9(C)(2)(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.9(C)(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
22. Id. § 64.2-308.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016). In addition, the surviving spouse may be
separately entitled to homestead, exempt property, and family allowances. Id. § 64.2-
308.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016). But see supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the
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parties' marriage, varying from 1.5% of the total augmented es-
tate for a marriage of less than a year to a full 50 percent for a
marriage of fifteen years or more.2"
The value of the surviving spouse's assets included in the aug-
mented estate and the value of assets she is entitled to receive in
accordance with the decedent's estate plan (whether or not such
assets are included in the augmented estate) are applied first to-
ward satisfying the spouse's elective share.24 Liability for any re-
maining balance of the elective share is apportioned among recip-
ients of the decedent's net probate estate and non-probate
transfers to others." The spouse may continue to occupy the prin-
cipal family residence and curtilage without charge for rent, re-
pairs, taxes, or insurance until her rights in the residence have
been finally determined and satisfied by agreement of the parties
or by court decree."
The spouse must file a written claim for an elective share with
the court or clerk within six months after the decedent's will is
apparent conflict between augmented estate and homestead allowance statutes as to
spouse's eligibility).
23. Id. §§ 64.2-308.4(B), -308.10(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016). This result is derived from a
two-step process: after determining the composition and value of the augmented estate,
one first calculates the value of the marital-property portion, which ranges from 3 percent
for a marriage of less than one year to 100 percent for a marriage of fifteen years or more.
Id. § 64.2-308.4(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016). One then determines the "elective share amount,"
which is always 50 percent of the value of the marital-property portion. Id. §64.2-308.3(A)
(Cum. Supp. 2016).
24. As with Virginia's current augmented estate system, the ourviving opouse cannot
choose which asscts will bc uscd to satisfy hcr claim; assets that pass or have passed to
Lh spo-use fsuii the dcccascd spouse arc charged against her elective share even if oho
disclaims them. Compare id. § 64.2-306(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015), with Act of March 1, 2016,
ch. 187, 2016 Va. Acts -, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.3(B) (Cum. Supp.
2016)). Thus, a decedent may choose the means by which he will provide for his surviving
spouse, including through the use of excluded property received by gift or inheritance from
a third party and maintained as separate property. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-308.10(A)
(Cum. Supp. 2016).
25. Id. § 64.2-308.10(C)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016). Recipients of transfers resulting from
a lifetime termination of a right, interest, or power, and donees of gifts made within two
years of death that exceed the federal gift tax exclusion, share in liability only if the value
of all other recipients' interests is not sufficient to make up any shortfall. Id. In all events,
third parties who receive a non-probate transfer from the decedent, and their donees, are
personally liable for contribution only to the extent they still possess the property so re-
ceived or the proceeds therefrom. Id. § 64.2-308.11 (Cum. Supp. 2016). They are not liable
for having transferred it or taken other action in good faith reliance on the governing in-
strument and before receiving written notice that the surviving spouse has filed a com-
plaint for an elective share. Id. § 64.2-308.15(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
26. Id. § 64.2-308.16 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
20161
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probated or an administrator qualifies on an intestate estate.7
The spouse must then ask the court to determine the elective
share by filing a complaint within six months after filing the elec-
tion.28 This two-step process gives the parties an opportunity to
agree on the calculation outside of a formal court proceeding.
Spouses may waive their elective share rights wholly or par-
tially in a valid marital or premarital agreement or other written
contract or waiver.29 A surviving spouse who has filed an elective
share claim may withdraw it at any time before the court enters a
final determination.0 A spouse who has willfully deserted or
abandoned the decedent is barred from claiming any interest in
the decedent's estate, including an elective share, if the desertion
or abandonment continues until the decedent's death 1
B. Uniform Powers of Appointment Act
With the exception of a few statutes scattered throughout the
Virginia Code, the interpretation and effect of powers of appoint-
ment in Virginia, like in most states, have been governed by
common law. 2 This has left gaps and uncertainty for planners
advising clients on their use. To address these issues and make
powers of appointment more predictable when used across state
lines, the 2016 General Assembly enacted a comprehensive stat-
ute to govern powers of appointment.3 Closely modeled after the
Uniform Powers of Appointment Act, revised Chapter 27 of Title
64.2 of the Virginia Code provides default rules for the creation,
interpretation, and exercise of powers of appointment in any in-
27. Id. § 64.2-308.12(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
28. Id. § 64.2-308.12(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
29. Id. § 64.2-308.14(A)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
30. Id. § 64.2-308.12(C) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
31. Id. § 64.2-308.14(E) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
32. See, e.g., id. § 64.2-406 (Cum. Supp. 2015) (formalities required for exercise of
power by will); id. § 64.2-423 (Cum. Supp. 2015) (exercise of power by residuary clause in
will); id. §§ 64.2-2700-2704 (Cum. Supp. 2015) (release of powers); see also, e.g., Leach v.
Hyatt, 244 Va. 566, 570, 423 S.E.2d 165, 168-69 (1992) (powers must be expressly creat-
ed); Holzbach v. United Virginia Bank, 216 Va. 482, 485, 219 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1975) (re-
quiring strict compliance with donor's requirements); Christian v. Wilson's Ex'rs, 153 Va.
614, 628, 151 S.E. 300, 304 (1930) (noting property subject to general power of appoint-
ment may be reached by powerholder's creditors).
33. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 266, 2016 Va. Acts __- - (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 64.2-2700 to -2741 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
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strument to which Virginia law applies.34 The statutory rules
yield to manifestations of contrary intent in the applicable docu-
ment.35 Issues that the statute does not address continue to be
governed by the common law and principles of equity.36
A donor can create a power of appointment over property in
any living, unborn, or unascertained person by an instrument
valid under applicable state law that manifests the donor's intent
to do so, transfers the appointive property or creates a further
power of appointment over that property, and specifies the per-
missible appointees.37 The power is not transferable;" it may be
amended or revoked only if the donor reserves that right at the
time of creation or if the instrument creating the power is revoca-
ble or amendable.39 Unless the instrument provides otherwise, the
power is presumed to be presently exercisable in favor of one or
more, but not necessarily all, of the permissible appointees, in-
cluding the holder, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate. 40
The holder can exercise a power of appointment by an instru-
ment that is valid under applicable state law and that shows the
holder's intent to exercise the power, substantially complies with
any requirements of exercise, and designates appointees that are
permissible under its terms.4 ' A clause that exercises all powers a
34. By default, the creation or revision of a power of appointment is governed by the
law of the donor's domicilc at the relevant time; the exercioe, reloase, or disclaimor of the
power is governed by the law of the powerholder's domicile at the relevant time. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-2705 (Cum. Supp. 2016). For the full text of the Uniform Powers of Ap-
pointment Act, see UNIF. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT ACT, (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2013),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=PowersofAppointment (last visited Oct. 3,
2016).
35. See Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 266, 2016 Va. Acts __ - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
64.2-2705 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (governing law); codified at id. § 64.2-2710 (Cum. Supp.
2016) (presumption of unlimited authority in holder); codified at id. §§ 64.2-2713 to -2715,
-2717 (scope of exercise); codified at id. §§ 64.2-2723 to -2724 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (disposi-
tion of unappointed property); codified at id. § 64.2-2726 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (revocation or
amendment of exercise); codified at id. § 64.2-2726 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (release of power);
codified at id. § 64.2-2741 (Cum. Supp. 2016) (application to existing instruments)).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2706 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
37. Id. § 64.2-2707(A)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2016). A power created in any unborn or unas-
certained person is subject to the applicable rule against perpetuities. Id. § 64.2-2707(D)
(Cum. Supp. 2016).
38. Id. § 64.2-2708 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
39. Id. § 64.2-2712 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
40. Id. § 64.2-2709 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
41. Id. §§ 64.2-2713, -2716 (Cum. Supp. 2016). Substantial compliance with any re-
2016]
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holder may possess (a "blanket-exercise clause") is effective, and
includes any powers the holder may acquire after executing the
instrument containing the clause unless (i) the holder is also the
donor of the after-acquired power and (ii) the document granting
the power contains an effective gift-in-default clause.42
A residuary clause of a powerholder's will (or a comparable
provision in the powerholder's revocable trust) that does not ex-
pressly exercise a power of appointment is nevertheless deemed
to exercise the power if the document does not manifest a contra-
ry intent, the power is exercisable in favor of the holder's estate,
there is no effective gift-in-default clause, and the holder did not
release the power.43 If a holder exercises a power in a disposition
that also disposes of property the holder owns, the combined as-
sets "shall be allocated in the permissible manner that best car-
ries out the powerholder's intent."44
If the powerholder may appoint to himself or his estate, he may
make any appointment that would be permissible in disposing of
his own property, including an appointment in trust or the crea-
tion of a new power.45 However, if the powerholder may appoint
only to his estate or its creditors, he may appoint only to those
creditors.46 A powerholder who may not appoint to himself, his es-
tate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate may appoint out-
right or in trust to permissible appointees pecified in the in-
strument creating the power, create a power of appointment in
them, or empower another person to appoint to one or more of
them.47
If the powerholder releases the power or fails to exercise it ef-
fectively, the appointive property will pass to the persons desig-
nated as takers in default in the instrument that created the
power.48 If no one is effectively designated, the appointive proper-
quirements for exercise imposed by the donor is sufficient if the powerholder knows of and
intends to exercise the power and the attempted manner of exercise "does not impair a
material purpose of the donor in imposing the requirement." Id. § 64.2-2716 (Cum. Supp.
2016).
42. Id. § 64.2-2715 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
43. Id. § 64.2-2714(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
44. Id. § 64.2-2720 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
45. Id. § 64.2-2717(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
46. Id. § 64.2-2717(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
47. Id. § 64.2-2717(C) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
48. Id. §§ 64.2-2721-2722 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
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ty may pass to the powerholder, to the permissible appointees or
back to the donor, depending on the nature of the power."
The powerholder may disclaim or release a power of appoint-
ment in whole or in part, and an appointee or taker in default
may disclaim all or part of an interest in any appointive proper-
ty.' The powerholder may contract to exercise or not to exercise a
power, but only if it is currently exercisable or becomes exercisa-
ble immediately upon the occurrence of a specified event (other
than the powerholder's death), the satisfaction of an ascertaina-
ble standard, or the passage of a specified time."'
If a donor retains a presently exercisable general power of ap-
pointment, his creditors can reach the appointive property to the
same extent as if it were his own property, unless the original
conveyance was not fraudulent and the donor/powerholder has ir-
revocably appointed the property to a third party.2 If the donor
retains a testamentary general power of appointment, the ap-
pointive property is subject to the claims of creditors of his es-
tate.5"
If a third party gives the powerholder a power to appoint to
himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate, the
appointive property will be subject to the claims of the power-
holder's creditors unless the power is subject to an ascertainable
standard as defined in section 2041(b)(1)(A) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.' Property that the powerholder cannot appoint to him-
49. Id. § 64.2-2723 (Cum. Supp. 2016). If the holder could have appointed the property
to himself, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate, the unappointed property
will pass to the powerholder or, if he is not living or is not a permissible appointee, to his
estate, if it is a permissible appointee; if neither the powerholder nor his estate is a per-
missible appointee, the unappointed property will revert to the donor of the power or the
donor's successor in interest. Id. If the powerholder could not appoint to himself, his es-
tate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate, the unappointed property will pass to the
permissible appointees if they are defined and limited; otherwise, it will revert to the do-
nor or the donor's successors. Id.
50. Id. §§ 64.2-2727-2728 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
51. Id. §§ 64.2-2732-2733 (Cum. Supp. 2016). No other powerholder may contract to
exercise or not to exercise a power unless the holder is also the donor of the power and has
reserved the power in a revocable trust. Id.
52. Id. § 64.2-2735 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
53. Id. These rules apply regardless of when the claim arose and regardless of the
presence of a spendthrift provision; but, the donor retains the right to specify the sources
from which the estate liabilities are to be paid. Id. § 64.2-2735(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
54. See 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A) (2012) (stating that an ascertainable standard re-
lates to the individual's "health, education, support, or maintenance"). Where the appoin-
2016]
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self, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his estate is ex-
empt from creditor claims unless the original property transfer
was a fraudulent conveyance or unless the powerholder or his es-
tate is the initial taker in default.5
The new statutory provisions apply to all powers of appoint-
ment, whenever created, and to all judicial proceedings relating
to powers of appointment except to the extent a court, hearing a
proceeding that commenced before July 1, 2016, finds that its ap-
plication "would interfere substantially with the effective conduct
of the judicial proceeding or prejudice a right of a party."'56 Statu-
tory rules and presumptions apply to preexisting instruments
that do not clearly indicate a contrary intent.7 Prior law contin-
ues to apply, however, to a right acquired, extinguished, or barred
on the expiration of a statutory period that began before that
date.55
C. Protection of Insurance and Annuity Proceeds from Creditors
For the last thirty years, the value of any benefit under a life
insurance or annuity contract was generally subject to claims by
the insured's or the owner's creditors; only actual proceeds paid to
an assignee or lawful beneficiary were protected from the in-
sured's or owner's creditors, and even then only in certain cir-
cumstances.59 However, in a move that caught many trust and es-
tate practitioners by surprise, the 2016 Virginia legislature
departed significantly from this conservative policy by amending
the statute to be much more favorable to those seeking to protect
assets from possible future creditors.'
tive property is subject to claims by the powerholder's creditors, it may be reached only to
the extent the powerholder's own property or his estate, as the case may be, is insufficient
to satisfy the claims and, in the case of estate creditors, only to the extent the powerholder
has not effectively directed that the liabilities be paid from other sources. See Act of Mar.
7, 2016, ch. 266, 2016 Va. Acts __, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-2736 (Cum. Supp.
2016)).
55. See Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 266, 2016 Va. Acts __, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 64.2-2738 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
56. Id. § 64.2-2741(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
57. Id. § 64.2-2741(A)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
58. Id. § 64.2-2741(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
59. See id. § 38.2-3122 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
60. See Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 274, 2016 Va. Acts __ - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3122 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
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Under the new law, the value of any benefit derived from a life
insurance or annuity policy is generally exempt not only from the
claims of creditors of the person who effected the policy, the in-
sured, and the policy owner, but also from the creditors of anyone
who is dependent on the insured or the owner, including a spouse
or intended spouse.6 In other words, even a beneficiary's own
creditors apparently may not reach the proceeds in most cases.
Protected benefits include, without limitation, policy proceeds,
cash surrender value, and the withdrawal value of a settlement
or deposit.62 This statutory protection can be waived as to any pol-
icy "taken out, made, or assigned in writing for the benefit of the
creditor."63
D. Creation of Trust by Court
An amendment to the Virginia Uniform Trust Code confirms
that a circuit court may create a trust upon any interested per-
son's petition and may specify the trustee and terms, including
whether the trustee must qualify in the clerk's office, post bond,
and report to the Commissioner of Accounts.'
E. Exploitation of Vulnerable Adults
In recent years, the legislature has shown an increasing
awareness of the potential vulnerability of elderly and incapaci-
tated individuals to financial abuse.6' Two amendments enacted
in 2016 address additional situations that might lead to such ex-
ploitation.
First, the guardian of an incapacitated adult may not unrea-
sonably restrict the adult's ability to communicate with, visit, or
interact with others who have an established relationship with
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3122(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016). No protection is available with
respect to a benefit issued or effected within six months of the time the person claiming
exemption files a voluntary bankruptcy petition, is declared bankrupt or insolvent, or oth-
erwise seeks debt relief. See id. § 38.2-3122(E) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
62. Id. § 38.2-3122(A) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
63. Id. § 38.2-3122(C) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
64. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 186, 2016 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.2-719 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
65. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 16, 2013, ch. 452, 2013 Va. Acts 729, 729 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-178.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (financial exploitation of mentally incapacitat-
ed persons)).
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the adult.66 Second, if the local department of social services or
the adult protective services hotline learns of possible financial
exploitation of an adult who is at least sixty years of age or is in-
capacitated, and if suspected losses from the exploitation are
more than $50,000, it must immediately refer the matter and all
relevant documents to the local law enforcement agency where
the adult resides or where the alleged exploitation occurred.67 If
those places are unknown, then the referral must be made to the
law enforcement agency where the alleged exploitation was dis-
covered."
F. Payment of Unclaimed Property
To facilitate estate administration, there is now a procedure by
which someone may seek unclaimed personal property held by
the State Treasurer for a reported owner who is deceased.69 The
claimant must submit evidence of entitlement such as, in order of
preference, an appointment as fiduciary of the owner's estate, an
affidavit under the Small Estate Act, or a distribution order or fi-
nal accounting showing that the claimant is entitled to part or all
of the property." Absent such evidence, if the decedent has been
dead for at least a year and the property value (excluding inter-
est) does not exceed $15,000, the claimant may receive the prop-
erty by submitting a personal affidavit that closely resembles the
small asset affidavit authorized by the Small Estate Act. 1
G. Liability for Spouse's Medical Expenses
Spouses are jointly and severally liable for the cost of emergen-
cy medical and follow-up care provided to either of them.2 How-
ever, as of July 1, 2016, their principal residence will be shielded
66. Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 404, 2016 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-2019 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
67. Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 408, 2016 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1605 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
68. Id.
69. See Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 350, 2016 Va. Acts __ .. (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
55-210.20(B)-(C) (Cum. Supp. 2016)). The State Treasurer must develop and post on its
website a plain English explanation of a person's right to claim such property. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-210.20(D) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.20(B) (Cum. Supp. 2016).
71. Id.
72. See id. § 8.01-220.2 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
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from such liability for as long as they hold it as tenants by the en-
tireties and do not refinance it or transfer it to a new owner.3 Un-
fortunately, unlike other creditor protection provisions for entire-
ties property, this protection does not apply to an interest in a
principal residence held in the spouses' joint trust or in their sep-
arate revocable trusts.4 It also does not appear to apply after ei-
ther spouse's death.75
H. Guardianship Procedures
Two 2016 amendments slightly alter the procedural rules for
guardianships. 6 First, when a guardianship is modified or termi-
nated, the clerk must give notice of the change to the Department
of Medical Assistance Services, as well as the local social services
department if different from the one that received initial notice of
the guardianship.77 This may help the state recover amounts due
it from any special needs trust held for the benefit of an incapaci-
tated person. Second, if a petition is filed to appoint an adult
guardian or conservator for a minor who is nearing age eighteen,
the court does not need to wait until the child's eighteenth birth-
day before entering the order so long as it specifies when the or-
der is to become effective.8 This amendment will help parents
and guardians avoid any period during which no one has authori-
ty to act on behalf of the child.
I. Action by Board of Nonstock Corporation
Traditionally, the board of directors of a Virginia nonstock cor-
poration has been able to act only at a duly called meeting at
which a quorum of directors is present or by unanimous written
73. Act of Mar. 4, 2016, ch. 240, 2016 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-220.2 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
74. Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
75. Cf. id. § 55-37 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016).
76. Act of Feb. 25, 2016, ch. 30, 2016 Va. Acts -, _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-2011, -2014 (Cum. Supp. 2016)); Act of Feb. 25, 2016, ch. 31, 2016 Va. Acts
-, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.2-2001, -2009 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
77. Act of Feb. 25, 2016, ch. 30, 2016 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-2011, -2014 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
78. Act of Feb. 25, 2016, ch. 31, 2016 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.2-2001, -2009 (Cum. Supp. 2016)).
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consent without a meeting.79 Now directors of a nonstock corpora-
tion may also act without a meeting pursuant to a written con-
sent signed by fewer than all of the directors in office, as long as
the action does not also require adoption by or approval of the
members of the corporation." That method of acting must be ex-
pressly authorized by the articles of incorporation, the board
must have received at least ten days' notice of the proposed ac-
tion, and no director must have objected to the action.81
II. CASES
A. Effect of Fiduciary Conflicts
In Birchwood-Manassas Associates v. Birchwood at Oak Knoll
Farm, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether con-
flicts of interest and breaches of fiduciary duty by limited liability
company managers could be considered special circumstances
that equitably toll the statute of limitations on contract claims.2
A liquidating trustee appointed to wind up the affairs of an LLC
sued to collect outstanding loans from two other LLCs managed
by the same individuals who had managed the liquidating LLC.83
The circuit court held, however, that the statute of limitations on
the loan claims had run and that alleged conflicts of interest of
the managers and breaches of their fiduciary duties did not equi-
tably toll the statute.84
On appeal, the trustee argued that the LLC managers' conflicts
and breaches of duty constituted extraordinary circumstances
that should toll the statute because they had made it impossible
for the liquidating LLC to assert its rights within the statutory
period." The supreme court noted that a statute of limitations
may be tolled only pursuant to a clear statutory exception, which
was not present here, or pursuant to two types of extraordinary
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-868 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (action by vote at a meeting); id.
§ 13.1-865 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (action by unanimous written consent without a meeting).
80. See Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 382, 2016 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-865 (Repl. Vol. 2016)).
81. Id. § 13.1-865(A) (Repl. Vol. 2016).
82. 290 Va. 5, 5-7, 773 S.E.2d 162, 162-63 (2015).
83. Id. at 5, 773 S.E.2d at 163.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 6-7, 773 S.E.2d at 163-64.
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circumstances-a defendant's fraud or an affirmative act that
prevented the plaintiff from asserting a timely claim.86
The trustee contended that the managers' dual roles with the
liquidating LLC and its borrowers made it impossible for the for-
mer to assert its rights."7 The supreme court observed, however,
that the alleged conflicts and breaches were known to the LLC
members and that any of the LLC's other members could have
brought a timely action against the borrowers even if the manag-
ers did not.' Because a timely action could have been filed as a
matter of law, extraordinary circumstances sufficient to toll the
statute did not exist.
89
B. Severance of Tenancy by the Entirety
Most Virginia attorneys remember from law school that a ten-
ancy by the entirety requires the five unities of time, title, inter-
est, possession, and marriage.9' The source of the special creditor
protection provided to property held as tenants by the entirety
arises from the fact that the spouses own the property "as one," so
neither spouse may unilaterally terminate the tenancy.91
Against this backdrop, Evans v. Evans presented an issue of
first impression in Virginia: whether a deed executed by a hus-
band purporting to convey to his wife his interest in property held
by the entirety created a fee simple estate in her.92 Mr. Evans, as
sole grantee, originally executed a deed conveying to his wife "all
of his interest" in a residence they held as tenants by the entire-
ty.93 More than two years passed before the deed was recorded,
and the record did not show whether Mrs. Evans accepted physi-
cal delivery in the meantime.94 Years later, she conveyed "all of
her interest" in the residence to a trust, which did not provide for
her children equally.95 In settlement of a subsequent dispute after
86. Id. at 7, 773 S.E.2d at 163-64.
87. Id. at 7-8, 773 S.E.2d at 164.
88. Id. at 8, 773 S.E.2d at 164.
89. Id.
90. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 326-27 (3d ed. 1993).
91. See id. at 327.
92. 290 Va. 176, 179, 772 S.E.2d 576, 577 (2015).
93. Id. at 179, 772 S.E.2d at 577-78.
94. Id. at 179, 772 S.E.2d at 578.
95. Id. at 179-80, 772 S.E.2d at 578.
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her death, Mr. Evans waived any right to the residence except for
a life estate pursuant to her will and trust.96
In a quiet-title action after Mr. Evans's death, the circuit court
found the original deed ineffective to sever the tenancy because it
failed to show that the parties intended to transfer the residence
jointly to Mrs. Evans in fee simple.97 Consequently, Mrs. Evans's
subsequent attempt to convey it to her trust was deemed ineffec-
tive, and the circuit court ruled the property had become Mr. Ev-
ans's in fee simple at his wife's death.98
On appeal by Mrs. Evans's trustee, the supreme court an-
nounced a general rule that where there is sufficient evidence
that one spouse intended to convey the property to the other
spouse, and that the grantee-spouse voluntarily accepted it, the
requirement of mutual conveyance is met.99 While the record did
not show when or even if the deed had been delivered to Mrs. Ev-
ans, the supreme court found clear evidence that she had affirma-
tively accepted the conveyance by her later execution of a deed,
trust, and will, which all treated the residence as her separate
property.'0° It therefore reversed the lower court's holding and
held that Mr. Evans's deed was valid and effective and that Mrs.
Evans's subsequent deed conveyed the residence to her trust.'01
Three justices concurred in the result but expressed grave con-
cerns about the majority's analysis, based on longstanding princi-
ples of property law."2 The concurrence correctly observed that,
because the rules governing tenancies by the entirety treat a
husband and wife as one, neither has an interest that can be sep-
arately conveyed and that the "mutual consent" analysis on which
the majority relied had never before been recognized.'3 Even if
96. Id. at 181, 772 S.E.2d at 579.
97. Id. at 181-82, 772 S.E.2d at 579; see also Sundin v. Klein, 221 Va. 232, 269 S.E.2d
787 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 911 (1981) (noting tenancy by the entirety can be termi-
nated only by the voluntary action of both tenants or the death of one).
98. Evans, 290 Va. at 182-83, 772 S.E.2d at 579-80.
99. Id. at 185, 772 S.E.2d at 581.
100. Id. at 186-87, 772 S.E.2d at 581-82.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 187-90, 772 S.E.2d at 582-84. The concurrence would have held that the
various deeds were invalid, but that Mr. Evans, as sole owner of the residence after his
wife's death, was free to alienate his interest and that he did so in a subsequent agree-
ment that acknowledged his wife's trust as owner of the residence. Id.
103. Id.
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unilateral conveyance is possible, the concurrence pointed out
that the majority's approach left i unclear whether the tenancy
by entireties (and therefore the accompanying creditor protection)
actually terminates on the date of initial conveyance, the date of
recordation, or the date of actual acceptance.
104
C. Probate of Photocopy of Will
In Edmonds v. Edmonds, the Supreme Court of Virginia exam-
ined what the proponent of a lost will must show in order to over-
come the presumption of revocation so that a copy of the will can
be admitted to probate.°5 After Mr. Edmonds's death, his will
could not be located, but it was traced to his possession.0 6 The
court clerk nevertheless admitted a photocopy to probate.10 7 A dis-
appointed heir appealed, claiming that the proponent of the miss-
ing will had not presented clear and convincing evidence to over-
come the presumption that Mr. Edmonds had destroyed his will
with the intent to revoke it and thus had died intestate.08
After hearing ample evidence of the decedent's long marriage,
his wife's complementary estate plan, his repeated and consistent
statements to others about his goals, his prior practice of execut-
ing a new will whenever he changed his plans, his failure to re-
move the will copy from his files, and the inconsistency of intesta-
cy with his estate plan, the court held that a proponent need not
specifically prove what happened to a missing will; instead, the
proponent must only present clear and convincing evidence that
the testator did not destroy it with intent to revoke.' Since it
may be impossible for the proponent to explain what happened to
a will, the testator's statements and other circumstances showing
his consistent testamentary intentions may be the best evidence
to rebut the presumption."0 Affirming the circuit court's order
admitting the copy to probate, the supreme court found the ag-
gregate effect of the evidence was sufficient to prove clearly and
104. Id.
105. 290 Va. 10, 13, 17-18, 772 S.E.2d 898, 900, 902 (2015).
106. Id. at 14, 772 S.E.2d at 900.
107. Id. at 17, 772 S.E.2d at 902.
108. Id. at 17-18, 772 S.E.2d at 902.
109. Id. at 23-26, 772 S.E.2d at 905-07.
110. Id. at 20-23, 772 S.E.2d at 903-05.
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convincingly that Mr. Edmonds had not intended to revoke his
will.
11l
D. Nature of Lifetime Rights in Residence
The unpublished decision in Vance v. Beeman examined the
nature of a couple's rights under a contract for the construction
and occupancy of a residence on another couple's property.12 The
Beemans agreed to pay for an addition to the Vances' residence in
return for the right to live there rent-free and tax-free for life." 3
If the Vances sold the property before the Beemans' deaths, their
agreement obligated the Vances to reimburse the Beemans or else
provide them with comparable housing."4 When relations subse-
quently grew strained, the Beemans sought a declaratory judg-
ment as to their rights under the agreement."'
Finding that the Beemans had fully performed their payment
obligations under the agreement and had begun to reside in the
addition, the circuit court held that they had acquired a life es-
tate in the property and that the Vances retained ownership sub-
ject to the Beemans' rights, including rights to reasonable and ex-
clusive use and to ingress and egress."6 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the enforceability of the parties'
agreement, but reversed the lower court's conclusion that the
Beemans had a life estate, finding that their contractual rights
did not constitute an interest in the underlying land."'
E. Interpretation of No-Contest Clause
In Rafalko v. Georgiadis, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
sidered the extent to which a no-contest clause contained in a
trust amendment was enforceable against beneficiaries who had
signaled their intent to challenge the trust before learning the
111. Id. at 26, 772 S.E.2d at 906-07.
112. No. 141567, 2015 LEXIS 9, at *1, *3 (Va. Aug. 14, 2015) (unpublished decision).
113. Id. at *1-2.
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id. at*2-3.
116. Id. at*8.
117. Id. at *3.
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amendment existed."8 Shortly before Mr. Georgiadis died, he
amended his long-standing trust to increase the provisions for his
second wife at the expense of his sons' interests and to appoint
his financial advisor, who was his wife's friend, as trustee in place
of his sons."9 In the face of his sons' rancorous objections to these
changes, Mr. Georgiadis subsequently amended the trust to add a
no-contest clause that prohibited any beneficiary from "directly or
indirectly, by legal proceedings or otherwise" challenging or con-
testing "this trust agreement" or from "attempt[ing] in any way to
interfere with the administration of this trust according to its ex-
press terms," absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, or bad faith on
the part of the trustee.2'Also absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, or
bad faith, the trustee's decision that a beneficiary had violated
the clause, and thereby forfeited his interest in the trust, was to
be final. 2' The no-contest clause also directed the trustee to ob-
tain from each beneficiary a written release of all legal claims re-
lating to the trust.
122
Unaware of the amendment adding the no-contest clause, one
son, with the other son's knowledge and apparent consent, wrote
to their father's lawyer almost immediately after his death, ask-
ing the lawyer to preserve the file in anticipation of a contest.
2 3
The same son also wrote to his step-mother threatening litigation
if she did not agree to terminate the trust and divide the assets
between herself and the sons via a nonjudicial settlement agree-
ment. 1
24
As soon as the sons learned of the amendment's existence, they
withdrew their demands and released all claims relating to the
terms and administration of the will and trust.2' Nevertheless,
after consulting with counsel, the trustee notified the sons several
months later that they had violated the no-contest provision by
their actions, and therefore they and their descendants were not
118. 290 Va. 384, 388, 777 S.E.2d 870, 871 (2015).
119. Id. at 389-90, 777 S.E.2d at 872-73.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 390, 777 S.E.2d at 873.
122. Id.
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beneficiaries of the trust.126 Having nothing to lose, the sons
sought a declaratory judgment that they and their descendants
were rightful trust beneficiaries.'27
In ruling in the sons' favor, the circuit court found it irrelevant
that the sons were unaware of the no-contest clause; but, it held
that the references in the amendment to "this trust" and "this
agreement" limited the clause's reach to actions directed at the
trust as it existed after the final amendment, so the son's letters,
which referred to the previous version of the agreement (the only
one of which he was aware at the time) did not trigger the
clause.128 The circuit court also found that the trustee's decision to
exclude the sons as beneficiaries was made in bad faith and
awarded attorney's fees and costs to the sons.2'
On appeal by the trustee, the Supreme Court of Virginia de-
clared that no-contest clauses are to be strictly construed "be-
cause the drafter chose the language and forfeiture is disfavored
in the law."'3° It noted that, even if the trustee's exercise of discre-
tion is limited only by bad faith, fraud, or dishonesty, "a court is
vested with the authority to evaluate whether the trustee's ac-
tions were consistent with the terms and purposes of the trust
and in the best interests of the beneficiaries."'' Therefore, despite
language to the contrary in the trust instrument, the sons did not
have to show that the trustee acted in bad faith in order for the
court to review her decision.'32
The supreme court found that none of the trustee's assign-
ments of error challenged the circuit court's narrow reading of the
no-contest clause or its holding that the sons' actions did not vio-
late the clause.' In dicta, the supreme court also noted that the
finding of bad faith was not plainly wrong and was supported by
126. Id. at 391-92, 777 S.E.2d at 873.
127. Id. at 392, 777 S.E.2d at 874.
128. Id. at 392-93, 777 S.E.2d at 874.
129. Id. at 393-94, 777 S.E.2d at 874.
130. Id. at 395, 777 S.E.2d at 875.
131. Id. at 397, 777 S.E.2d at 876. The supreme court based this conclusion on VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-703(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2016) (noting that a trust in-
strument may not waive "[t]he duty of the trustee to act in good faith and in accordance
with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries").
132. Rafalko, 290 Va. at 400, 777 S.E.2d at 878.
133. Id. at 404, 777 S.E.2d at 880.
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evidence."' It therefore affirmed the circuit court's judgment rec-
ognizing the sons and their descendants as rightful beneficiaries
of the trust and awarding fees and costs.'35
In light of Rafalko, drafting attorneys should carefully review
their no-contest clause form language and discuss with their cli-
ents whether a no-contest clause should be triggered only if the
beneficiary is aware of the clause's existence. As this case illus-
trates, a no-contest clause is useful only as a deterrent, not as a
punitive measure.
CONCLUSION
The 2016 session of the Virginia General Assembly saw the
traditional rules protecting surviving spouses from disinheritance
give way to a new augmented estate system that many believe
will be more equitable. The new rules appear similar to the cur-
rent system in their mechanics, but they are based on a view of
marriage as an economic partnership rather than on prior notions
that spouses have an ongoing duty to provide for each other's
support. By taking into account the surviving spouse's separate
assets and the length of the marriage, the new statute will pro-
vide protection similar to the current system for a surviving
spouse in a long-term marriage where the marital assets were
held disproportionately in the decedent's name. However, it will
avoid creating a windfall for a surviving spouse in a marriage of
relatively short duration or where the marital assets were held
equally or disproportionately by the surviving spouse. Practition-
ers should take the time to study and understand the structure of
the new system and the differing results it may produce in order
to plan effectively. The Virginia legislature should also correct the
134. Id. at 399-400, 777 S.E.2d at 877-78 (discussing the standard for reversing a fac-
tual finding made by a circuit court). Noting that the son's letters were not sent to the
trustee, constituted only "discourse related to proposed conduct," and did not interfere
with trust administration or require any action by the trustee, the supreme court observed
that the no-contest clause had "had its intended prophylactic effect," so that the trustee's
subsequent decision to disqualify the sons as beneficiaries was "not motivated by a desire
to carry out the testator's intent or to protect the beneficiaries and was therefore done in
bad faith." Id. at 402-04, 777 S.E.2d at 878-80.
135. Id. at 404, 777 S.E.2d at 880. Three justices dissented, arguing either that the
sons' actions violated the terms of the no-contest clause or that the trustee's determination
was not subject to judicial review because the evidence did not show she had acted in bad
faith. See id. at 404-31, 777 S.E.2d at 880-96.
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homestead allowance statute to reflect that a surviving spouse
may claim it in addition to the elective share.
Legislation codified the rules governing powers of appointment,
which should prove helpful. Many Virginians will also benefit
greatly from the expanded creditor protection for annuities and
life insurance contracts, as well as for a married couple's princi-
pal residence held as tenants by the entireties in the case of joint
liability for emergency medical and follow-up care. However, in
the case of a couple's principal residence held as tenants by the
entireties, future legislation will be needed to continue the credi-
tor protection after the residence is transferred into trust or after
one spouse's death. Other 2016 amendments and clarifications,
while more narrowly focused, should prove useful in their specific
areas as well.
In terms of case law, the Evans decision unfortunately has in-
troduced some uncertainty into real estate transfers by approving
a unilateral conveyance of entireties property without specifying
the status of the property between the time one spouse conveys it
and the other accepts it.136 Legislation may be needed to clarify
the applicable principles.
By contrast, Birchwood was a useful reminder of the need to
assert rights promptly."3 7 Edmonds, Vance, and Rafalko all illus-
trated the facts-and-circumstances analysis that applies in most
cases involving wills, trusts, and estates, although Edmonds also
gave useful guidance regarding the applicable standards for pro-
bating a lost will and a careful reading of Rafalko will give practi-
tioners cause to reconsider their approach when using no-contest
clauses.3 '
136. See supra Part II.B.
137. See supra Part II.A.
138. See supra Part l.C--E.
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